KIMICHA

Damiani Grevas v. R (1970) HCD 217

 “I also find that the substantial justice of the case in this particular case is that the appellant did possess the moshi as charged and that to acquit the appellant on the ground that the glass of moshi was improperly admitted in evidence would be acting contrary to the provisions of section 32(2) of the Magistrates Court Act. This section if very important in our present system of our courts. It takes into account that justice has to be administered justly to all citizens and that the majority of the magistrates are laymen. The section has been created in order to balance the situation. It is also serving another important purpose and that is it fosters good understanding between the citizens and the court because it enable them to understand the law under which they are administered. It is important for the masses to have some understanding of the functioning of the forces of law and order. They must feel that they are there for their benefit and not mere abstract conceptions imposed on hem. An acquittal, for example, in such a clear case of guilt as the one under consideration because of undue regard to technicalities would have resulted in a very bad understating of the courts by those members of the public conversant of the facts of the case. They would have wondered whether the courts were for them or for invisible human beings”

Aboul Iddi Milani v. R (1969) HCD 155

Crim. App. 219-Z-66, 2/3/67, Kimicha Ag. C. J.

At one trial the accused was convicted on four counts of stealing by a person in public service, c/s 248(4) of the Penal Decree, and sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment. These offences were committed between February and June of 1965. At a second and entirely separate trial, the accused was convicted on four other counts of stealing by a public servant, these counts arising from different thefts from those dealt with in the first trial. The second group of offences took place between May and June of 1965. At the second trial, the accused was sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment on each count, sentences to run consecutively. Appeal here is from the sentences imposed in the second case only.

Held: (1) All the counts could have been, and should have been, combined and dealt with at one trial. Whether the separate trials were a matter of inadvertence or one of intention on the part of the prosecution, the sentencing of the accused was prejudiced by his being subject to separate trials. “(T)here is nothing illegal about what has happened; all I say is that the practice has been unfair to the (accused) in that ….. the court was able to impose a sentence which on the facts appears to be unduly severe.” (Citing Henry Julius v. Rex, Tanganyika Crim. App. 377of 1951, 1 T.L.R. 366).

            (2) The sentences on the four counts at the second trial are ordered to run concurrently with those from the first trial, so that the accused will serve a total of 9 months’ imprisonment.